research

job market paper

Electoral Turnover and Government Efficiency: Evidence from Federal Procurement, Conditionally Accepted at Journal of Politics [paper] [appendix]

abstract The president's dominant influence on administrative policymaking has sparked public concerns about resulting inefficiencies at federal agencies. I examine how the possibility of future electoral turnover can limit agencies' engagement in presidential favoritism, focusing on policy areas where Congress can use informal means to constrain agencies' actions under the separation of powers system. In those areas, forward-looking agencies might alter their behavior to accommodate future constraints from the opposition Congress, even given substantial presidential influence. I evaluate these incentives using federal contract data in the United States. I find that as the probability of congressional turnover increases, federal agencies under unified government are more likely to award lower-cost contracts through competitive bidding in the expectation that the future Congress might compel agencies to abandon non-competitive contracts given to firms politically connected to the president. My findings challenge the dominant perspective that electoral turnover necessarily degrades bureaucratic performance.


peer-reviewed articles

  1. with Hye Young You. 2023. ``Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policymaking.’’ Journal of Politics, 85(2), pp.701-717. [journal] [pre-print] [appendix]
    *Winner of the Founders Best Paper Award Honoring Bert Rockman in the President and Executive Politics Section at 2021 APSA
    abstract There is growing concern about the movement of individuals from private sectors to bureaucracies, yet it is unclear how bureaucratic revolving doors affect connected firms’ political participation. We argue that when connected individuals enter government, connected firms reduce their proactive forms of participation because their connected bureaucrats possess firm-specific technical and legal knowledge to help them achieve their policy objectives. We test our intuition by constructing a novel data set on career trajectories of bureaucrats in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and firms that are connected to USTR’s revolving-door bureaucrats. Empirical results show that firms with connections to USTR bureaucrats decrease their lobbying spending and participation on advisory committees under the USTR. The decrease in political participation is stronger when connected bureaucrats are more influential in policy production. Our findings suggest that decreases in interest groups’ political activities might not imply that their influence on policy making is diminished.

working papers

  1. The Dynamic Revolving Door in Regulatory Agencies

  2. Bureaucratic Delays and Organized Interests of Losers: Evidence from Trade Adjustment Assistance

work in progress

  1. Fiscal Crisis and Gender Pay Gap in Bureaucracy (with Elisa Wirsching and Hye Young You )