research
Peer-Reviewed Articles
[3] “Applications of GPT in Political Science Research.” (Simone Paci, Jeongmin Park, Hye Young You and Sylvan Zheng). 2025. Forthcoming at PS: Political Science and Politics. [journal] [paper]
abstract
This paper explores the transformative role of GPT in political science research, demonstrating its potential to streamline data collection and analysis processes. By automating the extraction of information from diverse data sources—such as historical documents, meeting minutes, news articles, and unstructured digital content—GPT significantly reduces the time and financial resources traditionally required for data management. We explore how GPT’s capabilities complement the work of human research assistants, combining automated efficiency with human oversight to enhance both the reliability and depth of research outputs. The integration of GPT not only makes comprehensive data collection and analysis accessible to researchers with limited resources, it also enhances the overall efficiency and scope of research in political science. This article underscores the increasing importance of artificial intelligence tools in advancing empirical research within the field.[2] “Electoral Turnover and Government Efficiency: Evidence from Federal Procurement.” 2025. Journal of Politics, 87(2), pp.572–587. [journal] [paper] [appendix]
abstract
The president's dominant influence on administrative policymaking has sparked public concerns about resulting inefficiencies at federal agencies. I examine how the possibility of future electoral turnover can limit agencies' engagement in presidential favoritism, focusing on policy areas where Congress can use informal means to constrain agencies' actions under the separation of powers system. In those areas, forward-looking agencies might alter their behavior to accommodate future constraints from the opposition Congress, even given substantial presidential influence. I evaluate these incentives using federal contract data in the United States. I find that as the probability of congressional turnover increases, federal agencies under unified government are more likely to award lower-cost contracts through competitive bidding in the expectation that the future Congress might compel agencies to abandon non-competitive contracts given to firms politically connected to the president. My findings challenge the dominant perspective that electoral turnover necessarily degrades bureaucratic performance.[1] “Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policymaking.” with Hye Young You. 2023. Journal of Politics, 85(2), pp.701-717. [journal] [pre-print] [appendix]
*Winner of the Founders Best Paper Award Honoring Bert Rockman in the President and Executive Politics Section at 2021 APSA
abstract
There is growing concern about the movement of individuals from private sectors to bureaucracies, yet it is unclear how bureaucratic revolving doors affect connected firms’ political participation. We argue that when connected individuals enter government, connected firms reduce their proactive forms of participation because their connected bureaucrats possess firm-specific technical and legal knowledge to help them achieve their policy objectives. We test our intuition by constructing a novel data set on career trajectories of bureaucrats in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and firms that are connected to USTR’s revolving-door bureaucrats. Empirical results show that firms with connections to USTR bureaucrats decrease their lobbying spending and participation on advisory committees under the USTR. The decrease in political participation is stronger when connected bureaucrats are more influential in policy production. Our findings suggest that decreases in interest groups’ political activities might not imply that their influence on policy making is diminished.Working Papers
“Bureaucratic Performance and Support for International Integration: Evidence from the Trade Adjustment Assistance.” (with Felipe Balcazar). [pdf]
- Coverage: USC PIPE Collaborative
abstract
Scholars have long argued that international integration can be sustained by providing sufficient government compensation to workers harmed by import competition. We argue that the success of such compensation also depends on the bureaucracies tasked with implementing it. Specifically, bureaucratic delays in delivering benefits to affected workers can erode trust in the government's capacity to mitigate the adverse effects of import competition, thereby weakening public support for international integration. We test this theory using the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. Leveraging quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual bureaucrats, we find that bureaucrat-driven delays in processing petitions shift voting behavior and public attitudes in the affected communities against international integration and the government. The effects are stronger where information about TAA delays is more likely to reach citizens. Our findings highlight broader political consequences of bureaucratic performance than previously considered.“Who Gets Protection from Protectionism? Evidence from the Buy American Act.” (with Soohyun Cho and Hye Young You). [pdf]
abstract
Contemporary U.S. protectionist policies are often initiated by the executive but little is known about the cause underlying their uneven enforcement across firms. We argue this unevenness arises because legislators—with institutional leverage and local incentives—shield politically connected firms from executive protectionist measures. We test this claim using the Trump administration’s Buy American actions (BAA), which penalized firms reliant on foreign—especially Chinese—suppliers. Combining firm-level data on federal contracts, supply chains, and campaign contributions, we analyze 2,053 firms from 2015–2019. A difference-in-differences design shows that the BAA significantly reduced contracts for firms with Chinese suppliers, but only among politically inactive firms in districts represented by less powerful House members or members lacking strong local ties. We also find that only less-protected firms adjusted their suppliers after the BAA. These findings demonstrate how legislative politics shape the implementation and international economic consequences of protectionist policy, underscoring legislators’ role amid presidential dominance in trade policymaking.“The Executive Unbound? Politicized Bureaucracy and Partisan Procurement under DOGE.” (with Luca Bellodi). [pdf]
abstract
The establishment of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) during Trump's second term marks an expansion of presidential authority over federal agencies. This institutional development provides a rare opportunity to examine whether presidents can leverage politicized agencies for political and electoral goals. Drawing on detailed procurement data and DOGE's cancellation records, we find that Republican donor firms were less likely to face cancellations, whereas firms donating to Democrats were more likely to lose contracts. Cancellations were less frequent in Republican-held districts, conservative agencies, and states favorable to the Republican Party. Leveraging the timing of the 2025 Wisconsin Supreme Court election, we use a difference-in-differences design to show that Wisconsin-based firms experienced a sharp increase in cancellations following the election, underscoring the strategic timing of DOGE's operations. Our findings shed new light on the consequences of agency politicization and align with the Trump administration's effort to consolidate its support base.“Leveling the Playing Field: Bureaucratic Revolving Doors For The Marginalized” [pdf]