research

peer-reviewed articles

[3] “Applications of GPT in Political Science Research.” (Simone Paci, Jeongmin Park, Hye Young You and Sylvan Zheng). 2024. Conditionaly Accepted at PS: Political Science and Politics. [pdf]

abstract This paper explores the transformative role of GPT in political science research, demonstrating its potential to streamline data collection and analysis processes. By automating the extraction of information from diverse data sources—such as historical documents, meeting minutes, news articles, and unstructured digital content—GPT significantly reduces the time and financial resources traditionally required for data management. We explore how GPT’s capabilities complement the work of human research assistants, combining automated efficiency with human oversight to enhance both the reliability and depth of research outputs. The integration of GPT not only makes comprehensive data collection and analysis accessible to researchers with limited resources, it also enhances the overall efficiency and scope of research in political science. This article underscores the increasing importance of artificial intelligence tools in advancing empirical research within the field.

[2] “Electoral Turnover and Government Efficiency: Evidence from Federal Procurement.” 2024. Forthcoming at Journal of Politics. [journal] [paper] [appendix]

abstract The president's dominant influence on administrative policymaking has sparked public concerns about resulting inefficiencies at federal agencies. I examine how the possibility of future electoral turnover can limit agencies' engagement in presidential favoritism, focusing on policy areas where Congress can use informal means to constrain agencies' actions under the separation of powers system. In those areas, forward-looking agencies might alter their behavior to accommodate future constraints from the opposition Congress, even given substantial presidential influence. I evaluate these incentives using federal contract data in the United States. I find that as the probability of congressional turnover increases, federal agencies under unified government are more likely to award lower-cost contracts through competitive bidding in the expectation that the future Congress might compel agencies to abandon non-competitive contracts given to firms politically connected to the president. My findings challenge the dominant perspective that electoral turnover necessarily degrades bureaucratic performance.

[1] “Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policymaking.” with Hye Young You. 2023. Journal of Politics, 85(2), pp.701-717. [journal] [pre-print] [appendix]
*Winner of the Founders Best Paper Award Honoring Bert Rockman in the President and Executive Politics Section at 2021 APSA

abstract There is growing concern about the movement of individuals from private sectors to bureaucracies, yet it is unclear how bureaucratic revolving doors affect connected firms’ political participation. We argue that when connected individuals enter government, connected firms reduce their proactive forms of participation because their connected bureaucrats possess firm-specific technical and legal knowledge to help them achieve their policy objectives. We test our intuition by constructing a novel data set on career trajectories of bureaucrats in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and firms that are connected to USTR’s revolving-door bureaucrats. Empirical results show that firms with connections to USTR bureaucrats decrease their lobbying spending and participation on advisory committees under the USTR. The decrease in political participation is stronger when connected bureaucrats are more influential in policy production. Our findings suggest that decreases in interest groups’ political activities might not imply that their influence on policy making is diminished.

working papers

“Diminishing Regulatory Capacity and Corporate Political Disengagement: Evidence from State-Level Workforce Shocks” (with Dahyun Choi). [pdf]

abstract Although there are public concerns about the declining capacity of regulatory agencies and its impact on regulatory outcomes, such decline could also lead regulated firms to disengage themselves from politics. We examine whether and how firms reduce their campaign contributions in response to decreases in state-level regulatory capacity. To do so, we collect original datasets on the workforce size of U.S. state environmental agencies and leverage variations in workforce shocks that arise from the gap between actual and appropriated workforce sizes. Our analysis reveals that state environmental agencies' workforce shocks decrease firms' donations to state legislators, particularly to those in the majority party and the Democratic party, but do not affect firms' contributions to their ideological allies. We also find that existing state-level restrictions on corporate donations do not moderate firms' political responsiveness. Overall, this article provides a nuanced picture of how diminishing regulatory capacity could shape corporate political activities.

“Bureaucratic Constraints on Embedded Liberalism: Evidence from the Trade Adjustment Assistance.” (with Felipe Balcazar). [pdf]

  - Coverage: USC PIPE Collaborative

abstract Scholars have long claimed that international integration can be sustained by providing sufficient government compensation to workers adversely affected by it. We argue that the success of this social contract—known as Embedded Liberalism—also depends on the bureaucracies responsible for delivering the compensation. Bureaucratic delays in delivering compensation can undermine citizens' confidence in the government's ability to protect them from the adverse consequences of international trade, leading to diminished support for redistribution and globalization. We test our theory on the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States. By leveraging the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual bureaucrats, we estimate the effect of bureaucrat-driven delays in processing petitions on the attitudes of over 200,000 voters from 2006 to 2016. Empirical results support our theory and indicate that effects are stronger where the information is more likely to reach citizens. We discuss how bureaucratic hurdles in redistributive programs may significantly contribute to the backlash against globalization.

“The Dynamic Revolving Door in Regulatory Agencies.”

work in progress

Partisan Enforcement of Executive Orders: Evidence from Buy American Act (with Soohyun Cho and Hye Young You)

Cutting Red Tape Through Bureaucratic Revolving Doors